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11 Introduction
In societies across the globe, and throughout centuries, there has been a wide public
consensus that "punishment should ﬁt the crime" in the sense that more severe crimes
which harm others more should be more severely punished. Hamilton and Rytina
(1980) and Carlsmith et al. (2002) conﬁrm this consensus in a sociological and in a
social psychological study, respectively.1
Not only is there societal agreement on this principle of just deserts, but also legal
codes, since the code of Hammurabi, largely abide by it. The idea of compensating
the plaintiff is central in contract law in particular. Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
oneofthemostwell-recognizedandfrequently-citedlegaltreatisesinAnglo-American
jurisprudence, states the following2:
"The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the
promisor to perform his promise but compensation of the promisee for the loss result-
ing from breach. ... In general, therefore, a party may ﬁnd it advantageous to refuse
to perform a contract if he will still have a net gain after he has fully compensated the
injured party for the resulting loss."3
Outside the legal contractual domain, there is evidence that people are intrinsically
motivated to abide by informal agreements, and that these private preferences for
keeping and breaching promises reﬂect the just deserts principle. Gneezy’s (2005) and
Sutter’s (2008) ﬁndings suggest that people trade off the beneﬁts of lying against the
harm that lying inﬂicts on the opponent. Given the beneﬁt, when harm is more severe,
more subjects prefer not lying.4 This view is also supported by social psychologists.
Hoffman (1982), for instance, suggests that guilt has its roots in a distress response to
the suffering of others which reﬂects internalized social norms.
Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to abide by agreements play a crucial role in the
enforcement of obligations in partnerships. In a partnership, two parties decide upon
a joint strategy which each partner prefers to acting on her own. Lack of enforcement
in partnerships often leads to inefﬁcient inputs or withers the prospect of joining forces
entirely.
1The latter even illustrate that people have a revealed preference for the just deserts motive despite
stating a deterrence motive when asked.
2In chapter 16. See also Uniform Commercial Code 1-305 cmt. 1.
3’Just deserts’ motive has become predominant even in criminal sentencing not only in Britain and in
some states in the United states but also in many European countries (Tonry 2001; von Hirsch, 2007).
4Breaching a promise is simply a lie about one’s future intentions.
2An agreement, whether formal and enforceable in court or informal and enforced
by social and psychological forces, typically speciﬁes efﬁciency-improving standards.
It often also speciﬁes the consequences of violations of those standards. Both legal,
social, and psychological enforcement, in turn, are shaped by justice principles such as
that of harm-ﬁtting of compensation and punishments which we will call the principle
of “just deserts” hereafter.
The analysis in this paper applies to any formal or informal partnership when the
enforcement scheme satisﬁes the principle of just deserts in the above-stated harm-
ﬁtting sense. The main question studied in this paper asks, how does enforcement
according to the principle of just deserts inﬂuence efﬁciency in partnerships. Should
enforcement take into account the speciﬁc nature of the strategic environment, and if
so, how?
It is shown that an enforcement scheme satisfying the principle of just deserts does
pretty well in partnerships where inputs are strategic complements.5 As contract efﬁ-
ciency is improved, the harm inﬂicted by a marginal contract violation increases, and
thus a marginal penalty, which increases in the harm, is stronger if the contract is more
efﬁcient. Therefore under speciﬁc conditions, if enforcement can improve the status
quo at all, it can also enforce a Pareto efﬁcient agreement. This is so, even when with-
out any enforcement, the gain of deviating from the mutual agreement increases in the
efﬁciency of that agreement.
On the contrary with strategic substitutes, the enforcement scheme should look like
the opposite of just deserts to provide better incentives to abide by more efﬁcient con-
tracts. Asamatteroffact, theParetoefﬁciencyofthecontractandtheincentivestostick
to it are in direct conﬂict in those games when just deserts hold. The harm inﬂicted on
the other by a marginal contract violation, and therefore the marginal punishment, de-
creases as the efﬁciency of the agreement is improved. Moreover, the gain from the
marginal violation increases in efﬁciency. Both these forces go against the efﬁciency of
the contract.
Contrary to the very economic motivation of enforcement, the just deserts principle
provides the weakest incentives for the most efﬁcient contracts when inputs are strate-
gic substitutes. To promote efﬁciency, punishments should rather be inversely related
to the harm on other, or at least not depend on the harm. Yet, this recommendation is
in sharp contrast with our basic intuitions of justice and thus it poses a challenge to the
5Bulow et al. (1985) introduce and deﬁne the concepts of strategic complements and strategic substi-
tutes. Actions are strategic complements if the incentive to increase one’s action increases in the action
of the other. The opposite holds with strategic substitutes.
3design of contracts and their enforcement.
Our results bear implications to two strands of literature. First, Becker (1968) and
the subsequent literature6 on non-strategic ‘markets’ of criminal activity point out that
the just deserts principle is reﬂected in optimal legal enforcement designed by a social
planner who maximizes the sum of expected utilities. Although it is well understood
why just deserts may be implied by optimal enforcement in such non-strategic markets,
surprisingly little is known about the implications of just deserts on particular strate-
gic microstructures of the economy, such as partnerships. Our result, pointing out the
crucial importance of strategic complementarity to the efﬁciency of the contract, con-
stitutes the ﬁrst steps to ﬁll in this gap.
Second, building upon Farrell (1987, 1988), there is a literature on pre-play commu-
nicationofintentions.7 Thecurrentpaperextendsthisliteraturebyallowingdeviations
from pre-play messages or agreements to be costly.8 These costs are assumed to sat-
isfy the just deserts principle. The cost could be driven by unmodelled social pressure
and social punishments carried out by the victim or outsiders.9 Alternatively, breach-
ing may trigger an emotional reaction, such as guilt or shame, in the offender. If the
offender has internalized the just deserts principle, then the negative valence of the
emotion increases in the harm inﬂicted on the other.10
Our model helps to understand experimental patterns in public good frameworks.
Communication is known to increase cooperation in public good games (Ledyard,
1995), but Suetens (2005) ﬁnds that, in the long run, communication induces non-
equilibrium levels of cooperation only when actions are strategic complements not
when they are strategic substitutes. With complements, cooperation remains higher
6Polinsky and Shavell (2000) review the theoretical literature on the public enforcement of law.
7See Farrell and Rabin (1996) for an overview. Cheap talk on private information was ﬁrst analyzed
by Crawford and Sobel (1982). In our model, information is complete and information transmission plays
no role.
8See Demichelis and Weibull (2008) for a recent evolutionary model where players prefer not deviating
from pre-play agreements but where this preference is of lexicographically secondary importance. Craw-
ford’s (2003) model of boundedly rational pre-play communication assumes that some players always
prefer sticking to their pre-play promises.
9Darley et al. (2000) illustrate that experimental outsiders’ willingness to punish increases in the
seriousness of the crime but not in the probability of the oﬀender committing the crime.
10Models of social norms assume that people have a preference for abiding by norms, of which promise
keeping is just an instance (Bicchieri, 2006; Lopez-Perez, 2008). Given that these preferences largely
reﬂect societal conceptions of justice (Hoﬀman, 1982), it is of interest extend these approaches to study
preferences satisfying the just deserts principle.
4than in one-shot equilibrium even after 30 rounds of repetition, whereas with substi-
tutes cooperation decays in a manner that typical for public goods experiments with-
out communication. Similar evidence can be found in Isaac and Walker (1988)11 and in
Kerschbamer et al. (2008). Given our interest in equilibrium, our primary interest is to
understand and predict long-run and steady state behavior. These long-run patterns
are well captured by our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 has the
main results. In section 4 the interpretation as informal pre-play agreements enforced
by intrinsic guilt feelings is discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The underlying game
For the sake of exposition, we use the terminology of legal contracts and enforcement
in this section. The alternative interpretation of the contract as an informal pre-play
agreement in one-shot games is discussed in section 4. For simplicity and to focus on
partnerships, we limit our analysis to two-player games.
The underlying interaction is given by the underlying game Γ = {Si, ui(s) : S → R,
i = 1,2}. The action set of player i in the underlying game is a ﬁnite set Si.12 A
combination of actions is an action proﬁle s = (s1,s2) ∈ S = S1 × S2. We mainly focus
on ﬁnite games with ordered strategies where higher actions are associated with higher
contributions to the partnership. Without loss of generality we label the actions from 0
to ni, Si = {0,...,ni}, and we call ni the maximal action of player i.
The underlying game payoff to player i is ui(s). Parties are assumed to be risk neutral;
thus ui(s) corresponds to the monetary compensation of player i. For any given action
of player i, her payoff is increasing in the action of the other player, j. Reﬂecting non-
increasing marginal productivity of each effort, payoff is concave (weakly) in own action
11Isaac and Walker (1988) have treatments with constant (weak complements) and decreasing (strict
substitutes) returns to scale in a public good provision experiment with communication. Isaac and Walker
suggested that the reason for lower cooperation rates with interior group optima might be the diﬃcultly
of identifying and agreeing on an interior group optimum. Our model on informal agreements proposes an
alterative, perhaps complementary explanation, which also holds in contexts where, even under strategic
complements, the eﬃcient proﬁle is interior.
12Results would hold with inﬁnite action sets if payoﬀs are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the
right hand derivative of the penalty is strictly positive at zero.
5and in that of the other player, where δi and σi denote the second differences of player i in
own and opponent action, respectively.13 For simplicity, δi and σi are constant.
The assumption on monotonicity in opponent action is made without a loss of gen-
erality. If the payoffs are decreasing in the opponent’s action, we can restore our ﬁrst
assumption by reversing the ordering of each strategy set. This has no effect on the
second differences. Thus, games with decreasing payoffs in the opponent’s action can
be analyzed using the same artillery.
Denote the underlying game best-reply correspondence of player i by BRi(sj). We
restrict our attention to games with pure strategy Nash equilibria and rule out mixed
strategies.14
2.2 Agreement
Before the game is played the players can enter into an agreement. An agreement
m speciﬁes the actions that the parties have agreed to take. Thus, if m ∈ M = S is the
agreement, then m1 and m2 are the agreed actions of players one and two respectively.
If only player i deviates from the agreement and plays a feasible action si 6= mi then
• the harm to j is hj : M×Si −→ R, hj(m,si) = uj(m)−uj(mj,si), and the marginal
harm to j is ηj(mj,mi) = hj(mj,mi,mi − 1).
• the gain from breaching to i is gi : M ×Si −→ R, gi(m,si) = ui(si,mj)−ui(m) and
the marginal gain is γi(mi,mj) = gi(mi,mj,mi − 1).
Noticethattheprimaryinterestisondownwarddeviationssinceupwarddeviations
never harm the opponent. Thus, marginal harm and gain are deﬁned in terms of a
downward deviation.
To simplify exposition, we adopt the following concepts. For m ∈ S and for k ∈ Z,
let us call m + k = (m1 + k,m2 + k) a symmetric change of actions by k vis-à-vis m.
13For all s,
δi = ui(si + 1,sj) − ui(si,sj) − [ui(si,sj) − ui(si − 1,sj)] ≤ 0.
and
σi = ui(si,sj + 1) − ui(si,sj) − [ui(si,sj) − ui(si,sj − 1)] ≤ 0.
14An extension to mixed strategies could be easily done. However, the enforcement of mixed strategy
agreements is questionable since randomized choices are not veriﬁable (Abreu, 1988). Thus, perhaps a
more natural extension is towards inﬁnite action sets (see the previous footnote). We could also allow for
agreements that condition the agreed actions on outcomes of pre-game joint lotteries (Aumann, 1974).
6Notice that m itself does not have to be a symmetric action proﬁle as long as both
actions are increased or decreased by the same amount. For k ∈ Z, the effect on the
marginal beneﬁt, on the marginal harm, and on the agreed payoff due to such a change
are thus γi(m+k) = γi(mi +k, mj +k), ηi(m+k) = ηi(mi +k,mj +k) and ui(m+k) =
ui(mi+k,mj+k), respectively. These latter two concepts allow us to study the incentive
and efﬁciency effects of symmetric changes of agreements. Yet, we will not restrict our
attention to such changes only.
2.3 Enforcement
If partners have agreed on m, a party pays a penalty or a compensation if she deviates
unilaterally and her deviation is detected and enforceable in court. Whether the pay-
ment is a penalty paid to a third party or a compensation to the other party, does not
play an important role since our main focus is on the incentive to respect or breach an
agreement which does not depend on the recepient of the compensation.
The magnitude of the compensation depends on the harm inﬂicted on the other
and is given by the function f : R → R+. The goal of the paper is to investigate the
implications of the class of compensation functions which are increasing and convex
(weakly) in harm. Moreover, if breaching the contract does not harm or it beneﬁts the
opponent, the player is not punished. Nonetheless, compensation is strictly positive if
the inﬂicted harm is strictly positive.15
Our assumptions allow for a number of possible compensation functions. An exam-
ple of a function with all the assumed properties is
f(h) = max{h,0}
ϕ, (1)
where ϕ ≥ 1 . Setting ϕ = 1 gives us the exact compensation or crime-ﬁtting applied
in the Hammurabi code, incorporating the principles such as “eye for an eye and tooth
for a tooth”. A ﬁxed punishment
f(h) =
(
γ, if h > 0
0, otherwise
, (2)
15First, f(h) = 0, if h ≤ 0, and f(˜ h) ≥ f(ˆ h) if ˜ h > ˆ h > 0. Second, for any h,˜ h,ˆ h ∈ R, f(h) ≥
λf(˜ h) + (1 − λ)f(ˆ h) ∀ λ ∈ [0,1] if h = λ˜ h + (1 − λ)ˆ h. Weak convexity ensures that marginal arguments
suﬃce when studying whether contracts will be abided by. This implies that the model can capture
some experimental ﬁndings that a model with a concave compensation function can not (see section 5).
Limited liability and the implied non-convexity is brieﬂy discussed in the concluding section.
7is not allowed for, however, since this function is concave in harm (because of the
discontinuity at the origin).
2.4 Incentive compatible agreements
Suppose the players have agreed to play m, and the exogenously given probability of
detecting an enforceable deviation from an agreement is θ ∈ [0,1]. When the model is
interpreted as one with intrinsic enforcement by emotions of guilt guilt, the parameter
θi ∈ [0,∞) is individual-speciﬁc and captures the proneness to guilt. Naturally neither
the intrinsic and the extrinsic punishment nor the two interpretations of the parameter
θ shold be considered commeasurable.
Let Γ(m;θ) denote the non-cooperative interaction following the agreement m. The
net payoff of player i who has agreed on an enforceable contract m can be written as
Ui : M × S × Θ −→ R, where
Ui(m,s) =
(
ui(m) + gi(m,si) − θf(hj(m,si)), if si 6= mi , sj = mj
ui(s), otherwise.
(3)
The payoff to player j who complies to the agreement and is not compensated for
can be written as Uj(mj,mi,mj,si) = uj(m) − hj(m,si).
Note that there is no punishment if both parties deviate from the agreement. It is
a natural assumption since it is not illegal for a victim of a crime to defend herself.
Contract law even requires the injured party to take measures to avoid losses, which
translates into best-responding to breach: "...the injured party is expected to take rea-
sonable steps to avoid further loss. Where he does this by discontinuing his own per-
formance, he avoids incurring additional costs of performance." (Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, ch. 347).
Let us deﬁne player i’s incentive to breach an agreement m as the difference between
the gain from breaching and the (expected) compensation, given that the other player
does not deviate. Once entered into, an agreement will be abided by, if each player’s
incentive to breach is non-positive, assuming that the other player does not deviate -
the agreed action of i must be a best reply to the agreed action of j. An agreement is
incentive compatible for i if
Bi(m,si;θ) ≡ gi(m,si) − θf(hj(m,si)) ≤ 0, for all si ∈ Si. (ICi)
The agreement m is a Nash equilibrium of the transformed game Γ(m;θ) when
the incentive compatibility condition holds for both players. Punishments can only
8strengthen the incentives to play a given proﬁle of actions. Thus, the following holds.
Proposition 1 If the agreement mi is a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game, then it is
incentive compatible for any θ in [0,1]. If θ = 0, then only Nash equilibria are incentive
compatible.
Notice that, since the opponent’s payoff is increasing in one’s action, the marginal
harm, ηj(m), is always positive. Marginal gain from breaching, γi(m), can be positive
or negative since monotonicity in own action is not assumed.16 Notice moreover that
player i will not be punished if she makes both better off by deviating. Consequently,
monotonicity even in own action must hold (non-increasing)17 at any agreement which
is incentive compatible. We denote this feasible set18 of agreements by MF.
Let us ﬁrst show that, within this set, non-positive marginal incentive to breach is
necessary and sufﬁcient for incentive compatibility. To simply formulate a marginal in-
centivecondition, wedeﬁnethemarginalincentivetobreach,βi(m,θ) = γi(m)−θf(ηj(m)).
Clearly, βi(m,θ) characterizes player i’s marginal breaching incentive in MF
i .
Proposition 2 Let mi not be a best-reply to mj in the underlying game, let mi ∈ MF
i and let
mi differ from the maximal and the minimal action, i.e. mi / ∈ {0,n}. Then an agreement m is
incentive compatible if and only if the marginal incentive to breach is non-positive, βi(m,θi) ≤
0.
The simple technicalities behind this result are as follows. The fact that the payoff
is concave in the opponent’s action implies that the harm hj is a convex function of si.
This is because the harm is just the negative of the underlying game payoff of j as a
function of si given mj. The negative of the payoff of j is rescaled by adding ui(m) to
all payoffs, i.e. hj(m,si) = uj(m)−uj(mj,si). Thus, by the assumption that the punish-
ment is convex in harm, the punishment is convex in si as a composite of two convex
functions. On the other hand, the underlying game payoff ui is concave in si and,
therefore, also the gain from breaching, gi(m,si), is concave. Consequently, checking
that neither prefers breaching the agreement marginally is necessary and sufﬁcient for
an agreement to be incentive compatible.19
16Remember that ηj(m) and γi(m) are deﬁned as eﬀects due to a marginal downward deviation.




i = {m|γi(mi + 1,mj) ≤ 0}. (4)
19Notice that it is crucial that we assume that f is a weakly convex function. Otherwise non-marginal
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3.1 Strategic substitutes
By deﬁnition, actions are strategic substitutes if i’s incentive to reduce her action in-
creases in the opponent’s action. Formally, for all s, ui(si,sj) − ui(si,sj − 1) − [ui(si −
1,sj) − ui(si − 1,sj − 1)] = φi ≤ 0. Let us now show that as the Pareto efﬁciency of
the agreement is improved vis-à-vis the underlying game equilibrium status quo, the
incentives to abide by it are weakened.
When payoff is increasing in the opponent’s action and one wishes to strike an
agreement which improves efﬁciency, both must agree to increase their investment
in the partnership.20 To understand the effects of increasing agreed contributions, we
will study the effect of increasing own contribution and that of the partner, each at a
time.
Each party dislikes unilateral increments of her own contribution above the equilib-
rium since, within the feasible set of agreements MF
i , this necessarily reduces payoff.
Moreover, since payoffs are concave, a party’s marginal incentive to breach, γi(m), in-
creases if her own agreed action is increased. On the other hand, her partner likes such
unilateral increases of the party’s contribution since the former’s payoff is increasing
in the action of the latter. Nonetheless, these marginal payoff-increases gradually de-
cline since the payoffs are concave. Thus, the the marginal harm on the partner due
to a marginal breach of the agreement is decreasing. As a combination of these two
effects, changing a party’s own agreed action unambiguously increases the incentive
to breach.
On the other hand, due to actions being strategic substitutes, a party’s marginal
downward deviation pays off better if her partner’s agreed action is higher; moreover
in this case, less harm is inﬂicted on the partner. Thus, increasing j’s agreed action
also unambiguously increases i’s marginal incentive to breach. The following lemma
summarizes.
deviations might pay oﬀ although a marginal deviation does not.
20This is due to equilibrium actions being best replies to each other and to the fact that payoﬀ is
increasing in the opponent’s action.
10Lemma 1
γi(mi + 1,mj) − γi(mi,mj) = −δi
ηj(mi + 1,mj) − ηj(mi,mj) = σj
γi(mi,mj + 1) − γi(mi,mj) = −φi
ηj(mi,mj + 1) − ηj(mi,mj) = φj
With strategic substitutes, φi < 0, the effects in lemma 1 on the marginal gain γi are
positive and the effects on the marginal harm are negative. Since an efﬁciency improv-
ing contract must specify actions being increased from the equilibrium status quo, a
conﬂict is implied between the Pareto efﬁciency of an agreement and the incentives to
stick to it in games with strategic substitutes.
Theorem 1 Let actions be strategic substitutes. If efﬁciency is improved vis-à-vis an interior
equilibrium, s∗, then the marginal gain from breaching is increased and the marginal harm is
decreased.
Alternatively, let s be an agreement which is more efﬁcient than s∗, and let θ be such that a
party is indifferent between keeping and breaching s. Then the party will breach all agreements
more efﬁcient than s and for all probabilities larger than θ, the party will keep all agreements
less efﬁcient than s and more efﬁcient than s∗.
3.2 Strategic complements
Let us now turn to games where actions are strategic complements. By deﬁnition,
actions are strategic complements if φi ≥ 0. It is easily seen that strategic complemen-
tarity does not change the impact of own agreed action on incentives to abide by the
contract. Yet, the effect of increasing the opponent’s agreed action is now the opposite.
Increasing efﬁciency requires upward adjustments in both agreed actions at the
same time. Whereas with strategic substitutes the opponent action effect goes hand in
hand with the own action effect thus deteriorating incentives as efﬁciency is improved,
with strategic complements, the opponent-action effect downplays the anti-efﬁciency
impact of the own agreed action. It is not clear a priori whether the effect of the own ac-
tion dominates the effect of the opponent action on the marginal incentive to breach. If
it does, then the marginal incentive to breach again comes into opposition with Pareto
efﬁciency.
To study the issue in more detail, we can alternatively decompose the effect on in-
centives into the beneﬁt-effect (lines 1 and 3 in lemma 1) and the harm effect (lines 2
and 4 in lemma 1). When φi+δi ≥ 0, the marginal gain from breaching is decreasing as
efﬁciency is improved. In this case, strategic complementarity is very strong - so strong
11that, if φi + δi ≥ 0 holds for both parties, maximal actions are efﬁcient and, moreover,
they constitute a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. Therefore, by proposition
1, the maximal actions are incentive compatible.21 The case of strong complementarity
is somewhat uninteresting for us since enforcement plays no role in achieving efﬁ-
ciency. Agreements then enact the part of a mere coordination device or a convention
when choosing among multiple equilibria. Our theorem below establishes that, even
in the more interesting case where actions are weaker strategic complements and the
efﬁcient proﬁle is not an equilibrium, contracts may achieve ﬁrst-best efﬁciency if any
improvements to efﬁciency can be achieved at all. It considers improving efﬁciency
through symmetric changes vis-à-vis the best status quo, i.e. underlying game equilib-
rium, (according to Pareto ranking).
Theorem 2 Let s∗ be the most efﬁcient interior underlying game equilibrium. Let φj+σj ≥ 0.
Let s∗ + k be is more efﬁcient than s∗ and incentive compatible for i and let s∗ + k − 1 be less
efﬁcient than s∗+k and not incentive compatible for i. Then an efﬁcient agreement is incentive
compatible for i.
Alternatively, let s∗ + k be a symmetric change of actions that makes the agreement more
efﬁcient than s∗, and let θ be such that a party is indifferent between keeping and breaching
s∗ +k and prefers breaching s∗ +k −1. Then the party will breach all agreements less efﬁcient
than s∗ + k and, for all probabilities larger than θ, she will keep all agreements s∗ + K more
efﬁcient than s∗ + k.
When strategic complementarity is weaker, the marginal gain from breaching in-
creases as efﬁciency is improved, δi + φi < 0. If complementarity is so weak that it
does not even dominate the concavity effect in the opponent action (let us call this the
opponent-concavity effect) σj + φj < 0, then also the marginal harm decreases as the
agreement is made symmetrically more efﬁcient. Incentives stand again in contradic-
tion with Pareto efﬁciency as was the case with strategic substitutes.
Yet, ifstrategiccomplementarityisstrongenoughtodownplaytheopponent-concavity
effect, φi + σi ≥ 0, then the marginal harm is non-decreasing and acts as an opposing
forcetothemarginalbeneﬁtasefﬁciencyisimproved.22 Ifthemitigatingroleplayedby
the increasing harm becomes sufﬁciently important to eventually level off the increas-
ing breaching incentive, then all agreements that are more efﬁcient than this threshold
21Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that, with strategic complements, equilibria are pareto-ranked
with highest contributions equilibrium having the highest rank.
22Its eﬀect is strengthened, if the punishment function is strictly convex.
12agreement are incentive compatible. The discord between efﬁciency and incentives
may thus be circumvented if the actions are strategic complements.
4 Informal agreements and guilt
Let us now pursue the intrinsically motivated approach. The intrinsic approach asso-
ciates the function f with guilt feelings, or disutility, about breaking the promise, m.
In this intrinsic context, the parameter θ is an individual-speciﬁc one measuring sen-
sitivity or proneness to guilt, θi ∈ [0,∞). Probability of detection plays no role since
the punishment is entirely intrinsic and a deliberate transgressor knows that she has
transgressed the agreement. The assumption that informal promises about intentions
are not merely cheap talk, and that people may feel guilty about breaching promises, is
very intuititive. There is also abundance of indirect (Sally, 1995) and some more direct
evidence (Vanberg, 2008) in favor of this view.
Notice that, if both players had zero proneness to guilt, the model presented above
coupled with a communication protocol would reduce to the renowned cheap talk
model of Farrell (1987). Our model thus extends the chap talk on intentions by Farrell.
As in Farrell, implicit in our formulation is an assumption that players have a common
understanding of what they agree upon, the mapping from agreements to prescribed
actions is exogenously given and common knowledge.23
Guilt has been discussed in several papers since Akerlof (1980) who develops a
model of conformity to social norms, or Frank (1988) who argues that it may well
be materially proﬁtable for an agent to have a conscience - a dislike for disobeying
social norms.24 Kandel and Lazear (1992) study a model guilt and shame in partner-
ship situations like ours, but not addressing the issue of strategic complementarity
and comparative enforcement power of agreements. More speciﬁc and experimen-
tally motivated models are proposed by Ellingsen and Johanneson (2004), Bicchieri
(2006), Lopez-Perez (2008), and Dufwenberg and Battigalli (2007).25 The former three
are more traditional outcome-based models where the agreement is considered as part
of the outcome or it is an exogenously given social norm. The present model extends
23This is in opposition to approaches where the meaning of messages is derived as part of the equilibrium
leading to multiple equilibria due to multiplicity of interpretations. As opposed to Farrell, the model in
this paper does not explicitly model the communication.
24Rotemberg (1994), and Bester and G¨ uth (1999) point out the importance of strategic complementarity
in rationalizing the choice to become altruistic.
25See also Kaplow and Shavell (2007) for a non-strategic model of guilt.
13the existing outcome-based models of guilt by allowing guilt to be increasing in the
inﬂicted harm. This feature is crucial for our results.
Dufwenberg and Battigalli (2007) model guilt as an explicit belief-dependent moti-
vation, aversion for letting down the expectations of the other. It thus falls into the cat-
egory of psychological games (Geanokoplos et al., 1989). While there is experimental
evidence that in some contexts preferences are belief-dependent, there is also evidence
that the agreements per se matter (Vanberg, 2008). The advantage of outcome-based
modelling is its simplicity, amenability to revealed preference interpretations (Cox et
al., 2007) and weaker reliance on the equilibrium assumption. Yet, our model has a
straightforward psychological game interpretation studying whether a given proﬁle
m can be sustained as a psychological Nash equilibrium26. In that interpretation the
agreement, as an argument of the utility function, is interpreted as the equilibrium pro-
ﬁle of beliefs and one is interested whether any player has an incentive to deviate from
that proﬁle. If not, we have a psychological Nash equilibrium.
The results of the previous sections fully carry over to the alternative interpretation
of intrinsic enforcement of infomal promises. Moreover, the informal model can be
extended to allow guilt to respond reciprocally to generosity. In this extension, guilt is
allowed to depend not only on the harm inﬂicted on the partner but also to increase
in the payoff the player would receive if both kept their part of the agreement, the
player’s agreed payoff. The more the partner agrees to give, the more guilty a player
may feel about letting the partner down. This approach allows us to prove a result
analogous to theorem 2. We can also derive a corollary which strengthens the result:
if anything more efﬁcient than a unique UG equilibrium is incentive compatible for i,
then an efﬁcient agreement is also incentive compatible.
We will now proceed with this extension of the model. To introduce the generosity-
effect formally, we adopt a measure for the generosity of the agreement. Let the lowest






where NE(Γ) is the set of pure Nash equilibria of the underlying game. The vector
of lowest Nash payoffs is u∗ = (u∗
1,u∗
2). For player i, the lowest Nash payoff is the
worst case scenario if the there is no agreement in place.27 The agreed payoff mea-
26See Geanokoplos et al. (1989) for a deﬁnition and discussion.
27u∗
1 and u∗
2 can result from diﬀerent action proﬁles.
14sures generosity by indicating how much more than u∗
i the player gets28 if both respect
the agreement, vi(m) = ui(m) − u∗
i. Player i’s guilt cost, θif(vi(m),hj(m,si)) would
now depend on this agreed payoff in addition to the inﬂicted harm. Notice yet that
even partners who were inﬁnitely prone to guilt could not agree on all agreements in
all circumstances since each party would have no trouble making efﬁciency-improving
unilateral deviations.
Guilt is assumed weakly increasing in the agreed payoff, vi, and in the harm, hj, and
whenever both are strictly positive guilt is strictly positive, otherwise not. If the player
inﬂicts no harm on the opponent or if the agreement treats the player ungenerously
(the agreed payoff is equal or below the worst Nash payoff), then the player will not
feel guilty about breaking a promise,
f(vi,hj) > 0, if hj > 0, vi > 0
f(vi,hj) = 0, if hj ≤ 0 or vi ≤ 0
. (5)




The entire game preferences of this form with γ = ϕ = 1 are closely related to tractable
preferences of Cox et al. (2006), and thus, our model can be broadly considered as a
tractable model of guilt.29
When accounting for the additional properties of guilt, we can show that a version
of theorem 2 holds.
Theorem 3 Let s∗ be the most efﬁcient interior UG equilibrium. Let ui(s + k) be convex in
k and let f be weakly convex in vi and supermodular30 in its arguments. Let s∗ be the most
28Any reference payoﬀ greater than this worst Nash payoﬀ will do as well. Rabin (1994) derived the
worst pareto-eﬃcient Nash equilibrium payoﬀ as the lower payoﬀ bound for a player engaging in cheap
talk, for instance.
29These latter formalize the following other-regarding preferences: the payoﬀ of i is (πα
i +ωπα
j )/α where
πi is player’s own material payoﬀ, πj is that of the other player, α ∈ (−∞,0) ∪ (0,1] is an elasticity
parameter, and ω is a function capturing reciprocity and other emotional state motivations. Setting
α = 1, ω(m) = θi max{vi(m),0} and normalizing πj = uj(mj,s) − ui(m) returns our entire game
preferences with the above presented guilt cost and γ = ϕ = 1 as a special case of the preferences in
Cox et al. (2006). Of course the truncation, max{hj(m,si),0}, is particular for our model of prescriptive
informal norms and it does not arise when modelling equity motivations as in Cox et al. (2006). The
relationship to outcome-based fairness models is discussed in the conclusion.
30Increasing harm weakly increases the marginal eﬀect of the agreed payoﬀ and vice versa.
15efﬁcient interior underlying game equilibrium. Let φj +σj ≥ 0. Let s∗ +k be is more efﬁcient
than s∗ and incentive compatible for i and let s∗ + k − 1 be less efﬁcient than s∗ + k and not
incentive compatible for i. Then an efﬁcient agreement is incentive compatible for i.
In this framework of informal agreements, we can prove even a more powerful re-
sult stated in corollary 1. If there exists an incentive compatible informal agreement
that improves efﬁciency vis-à-vis a status quo with a unique equilibrium, then a Pareto
efﬁcient agreement is incentive compatible.
Corollary 1 Let s∗ be the unique underlying game equilibrium. Let γi(s∗) = 0 for i = 1,2.
Let ui(s + k) be convex in k and f be weakly convex in vi and supermodular in its arguments.
Let φj +σj ≥ 0. Let s∗ +k be is more efﬁcient than s∗ and incentive compatible for i. Then an
efﬁcient agreement is incentive compatible for i.
This result relies, ﬁrst, on the fact that an ungenerously treated partner behaves
opportunistically, and second, on the fact that the equilibrium generosity is zero. Thus,
at the equilibrium the marginal guilt cost is necessarily smaller than the marginal gain
from breaching. Thus, if the increasing guilt cost ever levels off the increasing marginal
beneﬁtastheParetoefﬁciencyoftheagreementisimprovedduetoasymmetricchange
ofagreedactionsvis-à-vistheequilibrium, thisshiftinbalancewillholdforeverymore
efﬁcient symmetric agreement due to the convexity properties.
Some assumptions that have been made in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 become particu-
larly compelling in the context of informal agreements. More speciﬁcally, if the other
breaches the agreement, a victim does not typically feel bad about protecting herself
from exploitation. As far as the informal agreement interpretation is concerned, we
thus have assumed that, if the other party breaches, then a party feels no guilt whatso-
ever. Thisguaranteesthatmarginalviolationsoftheagreementwillhavenon-marginal
implications. Bicchieri (2006, ch. 1) discusses in length why conditional conformism
captured by this feature is necessary in any reasonable account of social norms.31 The
simple idea hidden in conditional conformism when applied to partnerships is that
people do not like to be exploited suckers.
5 Discussion
The model in this paper illustrates the implications of "punishments (or compensa-
tion) that ﬁt the harm" on the enforcement of bilateral partnerships. We show that,
31See also Lopez-Perez (2008).
16in partnerships where inputs are strategic substitutes, efﬁciency and the incentives to
provide input are in conﬂict. Nevertheless, partnerships with strategic complements
may avoid such conﬂicts, if strategic complementarity is sufﬁciently strong. If there is
an efﬁciency improving symmetric agreement that a player would not abide by and
another more efﬁcient agreement that she would abide by, then she is willing to abide
by a ﬁrst best agreement.
In section 4, we studied informal pre-play agreements in one-shot games which are
enforced by intrinsic motivation to avoid guilt about breaching. The pre-play negotia-
tion protocol was unmodelled, however. Thus, it does not matter for the results how
the contract is agreed upon. The conclusions would not be altered if the agreement
was established in a commonly known code of conduct - a social norm - rather than
in negotiations. Thus, one can alternatively use the model to analyze the comparative
enforcement power of social norms in various free-riding and public good provision
contexts. Yet, this would generally require an extension to a multiplayer setting in-
volving modelling choices on how punishments depend on the proﬁle of harms, for
instance. This latter is essentially an empirical question and I am not aware of convinc-
ing evidence favoring any given modelling approach. Thus, the multiplayer extension
is perhaps better left for future research.
One application of interest are symmetric norms in symmetric games. Such norms
can be essentially considered as equity norms. Not surprisingly, when interpreted as a
model of social norms, our model shares some features with inequity aversion models
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). An inequity averse offender also
feels guilty about transgressing a norm if it generates advantageous inequality. Thus,
as long as we consider symmetric agreements in symmetric games only, the punish-
ment can be considered as a disutility for violating an equity norm. Our results hold
for this particular application as well: if the actions are in material terms strategic sub-
stitutes, inequity aversion provides weaker incentives for efﬁcient play than for inefﬁ-
cient play, for instance.
In the literature on inﬁnitely repeated games, grim strategies require offenders of
(Nash) equilibrium play to be punished forever. These strategies provide the strongest
enforcement power, and in fact, any pre-play agreement on a stationary play can be en-
forced if each party gets more than her reservation payoff in each period.32 Neverthe-
32Any agreement m on a stationary play giving each player more than (1 − δi)BRi(mj) + δiui, where
δi is i’s discount factor and ui is player i’s reservation payoﬀ, can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium of
an inﬁnitely repeated game. Each player must receive more than a mark-up above the reservation payoﬀ,
if she is impatient. Abreu (1988) illustrates that in a perfect equilibrium the most severe punishment
17less, if the severity of the punishment (time spent punishing) is an increasing function
of the harm inﬂicted, as required by just deserts, a violator who inﬂicts minor harm
cannot be very severely punished. Thus, if the stage game actions are strategic substi-
tutes, efﬁciency of a stationary pre-play agreement and the incentives to abide by it are
inversely related. The most efﬁcient stationary agreements are the prime suspects not
to be enforceable when just deserts hold. The conclusions of the model will continue to
hold if the interaction is repeated and punishments cannot be agreed upon but are ex-
ogenously given and follow the just deserts principle. Parameter θi is now associated
with a player’s dicount factor and f maps the inﬂicted harm into a punishment path.
For the extrinsic interpretation of the enforcement model, it is interesting to specu-
late on how our results would be inﬂuenced by introducing liability constraints on the
compensation that the offender pays to the plaintiff. Intuitively, this should have no
effect on the result on strategic substitutes as drastic underlying game best-reply de-
viations would be perceived for low levels of efﬁciency where harm is large and thus
compensation hits the limit. Yet, this increased breaching incentive would tend to dis-
appear with efﬁciency, in line with out established result. Nevertheless, when actions
are strategic complements, an ambiguity would appear at high efﬁciency levels where
harm is so large that compensation exceeds the liability constraint. With intermedi-
ate strategic complementarity where both the marginal gain and the marginal harm
increase in efﬁciency, limited liability would potentially imply a u-shaped association
between efﬁciency and incentives to breach.
That offenders should receive their just deserts is a widely applied principle in hu-
man interaction. It is so natural to us that we hardly pay attention how substantially
it inﬂuences the formal and informal institutions that surround us and constrain our
lives. In strategic rather than non-strategic interaction, it is perhaps even more impor-
tant to thoroughly understand how justice principles shape the incentives to abide by
agreements. This is because only in strategic interaction even marginal violations may
induce non-marginal and unpredictable consequences and prevent mutually beneﬁcial
joint ventures from ﬂourishing. This paper points out that the strategic nature of the
underlying interaction, whether one-shot or repeated, and the institutional features of
punishments, whether formal or informal, have crucial and surprising interdependen-
cies that should not be neglected if we are concerned about providing optimal third
party enforcement for voluntarily initiated partnerships.
has a stick-and-carrott structure and thus holding the other to her reservation payoﬀ for inﬁnitely long
payoﬀ is not feasible.
186 Appendix
Here we give proofs for the extended model where cost is a function of generosity of j,
vi, in addition to the harm (Section 4). Proofs of the case in the text where f is a function
of hj only are mainly special cases and where they are not, it will be indicated.
6.1 Proof of proposition 2
Lemma 2 returns proposition 2 in the text (where f is a function of hj only) as a special
case.
Lemma 2 Let Γ be ﬁnite. Let mi 6= {0,n}, mi ∈ MF
i and mi / ∈ BRi(mj). Then an agreement
m is incentive compatible if and only if βi(m,θi) ≤ 0.
Wewillshowthat(ICi)doesnotholdifandonlyifβi(m,θi) > 0. Letβi(m,θi) > 0.By
the deﬁnition of βi(m,θi), B(m,mi − 1;θi) = γi(m) − θif(vi(m),ηj(m)) > 0 and thus
incentive compatibility, (ICi), is violated.
Letincentivecompatibility, (ICi), beviolated. Thus, thereiss0
i suchthatBi(m,s0
i;θi) >
0. Suppose to the contrary that βi(m,θi) ≤ 0 and thus
ui(mi − 1,mj) − ui(mi,mj) ≤ f(vi(m),hj(m,mi − 1)).
There are two cases to consider ui(mi − 1,mj) − ui(mi,mj) < 0 and ui(mi − 1,mj) −
ui(mi,mj) ≥ 0. In the ﬁrst case, it is also true that ui(mi,mj) − ui(mi + 1,mj) < 0 since
otherwise mi is an underlying best-reply to mj by the concavity of ui in its ﬁrst ar-
gument. Now ui(mi,mj) − ui(mi + 1,mj) < 0 implies that mi / ∈ MF
i which is a con-
tradiction. In the second subcase ui(mi − 1,mj) − ui(mi,mj) = γi(m) > 0 and thus
f(vi(m),hj(m,mi − 1)) > 0 since βi(m,θi) ≤ 0. By assumption, harm increases in de-
viations further downwards. Also by assumption guilt cost is convex in hj and uj is
concave in si. Thus harm is convex in si and the guilt cost is also convex in si as a
composite of two convex functions. On the other hand by assumption, the payoff ui is
concave in si and thus the gain from breaching ui(si,mj) − ui(mi,mj) is concave in si.
Thus if βi(m,θi) ≤ 0 then B(m,s;θi) ≤ 0 for all si < mi. We have a contradiction.
6.2 Proof of lemma 1
γi(mi + 1,mj) − γi(mi,mj)
= ui(mi,mj) − ui(mi + 1,mj) − [ui(mi − 1,mj) − ui(mi,mj)]
19= −δi
γi(mi,mj + 1) − γi(mi,mj)
= ui(mi − 1,mj + 1) − ui(mi,mj + 1) − [ui(mi − 1,mj) − ui(mi,mj)]
= −φi
ηj(mj,mi + 1) − ηj(mj,mi)
= uj(mj,mi + 1) − uj(mj,mi) − [uj(mj,mi) − uj(mj,mi − 1)]
= σj
ηj(mj + 1,mi) − ηj(mj,mi)
= uj(mj + 1,mi) − uj(mj + 1,mi − 1) − [uj(mj,mi) − uj(mj,mi − 1)]
= φj ¥
6.3 Proof of theorem 1
Since s is more efﬁcient than s∗, it must be that si ≤ s∗
i for i = 1,2. To see this, notice
that since the payoff is increasing in the opponent’s action and s∗
i is a best-reply to s∗
j ,
for any si ≤ s∗
i, uj(s∗) ≥ uj(sj,s∗
i) > uj(s). Thus each action at s must necessarily be
weakly greater than at s∗ to increase efﬁciency. But in that case, by lemma 1, γi(s) >
γi(s∗) and ηj(s) < ηj(s∗). ¥
6.4 Proof of theorem 2
Since s∗ + k is more efﬁcient than s∗, it must be that k > 0 by the same argument as
in the proof of 1. Thus for a symmetric change of actions to be efﬁciency-improving, it
must hold that k > 0.
Let ﬁrst φi + δi < 0. Since s∗ + k is incentive compatible for i and s∗ + k − 1 is not
incentive compatible for i, by lemma 3 (below), for every K > k, s∗ + K is incentive
compatible for i.
Let us show that i’s payoff-maximizing proﬁle among symmetric increases of ac-
tions, denote it by s∗ + ki , exists and satisﬁes ki ≥ k. To see this, suppose ﬁrst that
σi + δi + 2φi ≥ 0. The assumption implies that ui(s + K) is convex in K. Now, by the
argument above, ui(s∗) − ui(s∗ − K) > 0 for any K > 0. Therefore, every symmetric
increase of actions increases the payoff of i vis a vis s∗ and by the boundedness of the
strategy space, there exists ki such that s∗ + ki maximises i’s payoff. Suppose alterna-
tively that σi + δi + 2φi < 0. Then ui(s + K) is strictly concave in K. By assumption,
ui(s∗ + k) ≥ ui(s∗ + k − 1). Since the strategy set is ﬁnite, a maximizer s∗ + k among
20symmetric increases of actions exists and it satisﬁes k ≥ k. By the same arguments,
there is a kj ≥ k which maximizes j’s payoff among the symmetric changes of actions.
Let k be deﬁned as min(ki,kj). Notice that by the argument above, s∗+k is incentive
compatible for i.
Let us show that s∗ + k is efﬁcient if φj + δj < 0. (We will return further below to
the case φj + δj ≥ 0.) It is easy to see that no symmetric change of actions is Pareto-
preferred to s∗ + k. Moreover no unilateral change of an action is Pareto-preferred
since s∗ is an equilibrium and thus, by lemma 3.1, γi(s∗
i + K + 1,s∗
j + K) ≥ 0 for K ≥ 0
and payoffs are concave in own action. Thus i’s payoff is worse if her action alone is
increased from s∗+k. On the other hand, if i’s action is decreased, j’s payoff decreases
by assumption. Combinations of symmetric changes of actions and unilateral changes
of one particular action reach any strategy where si > s∗
i yielding the result.
If φj + δj ≥ 0, there may be no symmetric change of actions that is efﬁcient. This is
the case if at s∗ + k as deﬁned above γj(s∗
j + k + 1,s∗
i + k) < 0 , in which case j can
improve the payoff of both by deviating upwards. Let thus j’s action be increased until
her UG best-response is reached (which can satisfy sj = nj). Since j’s agreed action is
unilaterally increased, by lemma 3.1, γi is weakly smaller and ηj is weakly greater than
before the unilateral increase of j’s action. Thus, i’s marginal incentive to breach is




0 and thus, s∗
i + k is not i’s UG best-reply to none of the actions between s∗
j + k and
BRj(s∗
i + k) , then (s∗
i + k,BRj(s∗
i + k)) is efﬁcient and incentive compatible for i.
If γi(s∗
i + k + 1,BRj(s∗
i + k)) < 0, then one can increase the agreed action of i until
γi(s∗
i +k +K +1,BRj(s∗
i +k +K)) ≥ 0. Such K exists since strategy sets are bounded.
Since such changes can always be made as a sequence of marginal changes of one of
the actions at a time so that γi,γj ≤ 0 (and one with strict inequality), both payoffs and
thus efﬁciency is increased due to these changes. Moreover, in the resulting proﬁle,
each action is an UG best-reply to that of the other. Thus, as a Nash equilibrium of the
UG, the proﬁle is incentive compatible for i.
Consider now the case, 0 ≤ δi + φi. Now the marginal gain from breaching is de-




i + K + 1,s∗
j + K) ≥ 0. Thus for K ≥ 0, γi(s∗
i + K,s∗
j + K) < 0 and if there is k0
such that γi(s∗
i +k0 +1,s∗
j +k0) ≥ 0, then for every 0 < k < k0, γi(s∗
i +k +1,s∗
j +k) ≥ 0.
Therefore, s∗ + k can be incentive compatible but not s∗ + k − 1 only if s∗
i + k = ni.
If moreover γj(s∗
j + k + 1,s∗
i + k) ≤ 0 or if s∗
j + k = nj, then s∗ + k is efﬁcient. If
γj(s∗
j + k + 1,s∗
i + k) > 0 and s∗
j + k < nj, then one can increase the action of j until
21sj = BRj(ni). It is easy to see that this increases efﬁciency and, moreover, since actions
are strategic complements, player i has even more of an incentive to choose si = ni.
Thus, (ni,BRj(ni)) is efﬁcient and incentive compatible for i.
Lemma 3 Lettheunderlyinggamepayoffseconddifferencessatisfyφi+δi < 0andφi+σi ≥ 0.
Supposethatγi(s−1) ≥ θif(ηj(s−1)).Ifγi(s) ≤ θif(ηj(s))thenγi(s+k) ≤ θif(ηj(s+k))for
all k > 0.
By lemma 1, the marginal incentive to breach, γi(s+k), is increasing and concave in
k and the marginal harm on the other, ηj(s + k), is non-decreasing and convex in k.
Also f(ηj(s + k)) is convex and non-decreasing in k since g is convex in η for ηj ≥ 0.
Also since γi(s − 1) ≥ θif(ηj(s − 1)) ≥ 0 but γi(s) ≤ θif(ηj(s)), we have
γi(s) − γi(s − 1)
≤ θif(ηj(s)) − θif(ηj(s − 1)).
Thus, since f(ηj(s + k)) is convex and non-decreasing in k,
0 ≤ γi(s + 1) − γi(s)
= −δi − φi
= γi(s) − γi(s − 1)
≤ θif(ηj(s)) − θif(ηj(s − 1))
≤ θif(ηj(s + 1)) − θif(ηj(s)).
We can proceed by induction to show that for every s + k with k > 0, we have
γi(s + k) − θif(ηj(s + k)) ≤ γi(s) − θif(ηj(s)) ≤ 0. Thus every s + k with k > 0 is
incentive compatible.
Proof of theorem 3
The proof is along the lines of the proof of theorem 2 above. Yet, instead of applying
lemma 3 one should apply 4 below. ¥




incentive compatible for i implying γi(s∗ + k0
i) ≤ θif(vi(s∗ + k0
i),ηj(s∗ + k0
i)). On the
other hand s∗ satisﬁes γi(s∗) ≥ θif(0,ηj(s∗)) = 0 as the unique UG equilibrium. Thus,
the claim follows from theorem 3. ¥
226.5 Proof of lemma 4
Lemma 4 Let the underlying game payoff second differences satisfy σj + φj ≥ 0, φi + δi <
0 and 2φi + δi + σi ≥ 0. Let s be symmetric, that is si = sj. Let ui(s) − ui(s − 1) ≥
0. Let g be supermodular. Suppose that γi(s − 1) ≥ θif(vi(s − 1),ηj(s − 1)). If γi(s) ≤
θif(vi(s),ηj(s)) then γi(s + k) ≤ θif(vi(s + k),ηj(s + k)) for all k > 0.
By lemma 1, the marginal gain from breaching, γi(s + k), is increasing and concave
in k and the marginal harm, ηj(s + k), is non-decreasing and convex in k.
Since δ+2φ+σ ≥ 0 and ui(s)−ui(s−1) ≥ 0, u(s+k) is convex and non-decreasing in
k for k ≥ 0. Thus, f(vi(s+k),ηj(s)) is convex and non-decreasing in k since g is convex
and non-decreasing in v. Similarly, f(vi(s),ηj(s + k)) is convex and non-decreasing in
k since g is convex in η for η ≥ 0.
Also since γi(s − 1) ≥ θif(vi(s − 1),ηj(s − 1)) ≥ 0 but γi(s) ≤ θif(vi(s),ηj(s)), we
have
γi(s) − γi(s − 1)
≤ θif(vi(s),ηj(s)) − θif(vi(s − 1),ηj(s − 1)).
Thus, since g is supermodular and convex in its arguments,
0 ≤ γi(s + 1) − γi(s)
= −δ − φ
= γi(s) − γi(s − 1)
≤ θif(vi(s),ηj(s)) − θif(vi(s − 1),ηj(s − 1))
≤ θif(vi(s + 1),ηj(s + 1)) − θif(vi(s),ηj(s)).
We can proceed by induction to show that for every s + k with k > 0, we have
γi(s + k) − θif(vi(s + k),ηj(s + k)) ≤ γi(s) − θif(vi(s),ηj(s)) ≤ 0. Above, we showed
that ui(s + k) > ui(s) for k > 0. Thus every s + k with k > 0 is incentive compatible.
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